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right direction. Judicial interpretation will eventually make specific
its general terms and establish a guide for its enforcement.
LAWRENCE D. BELL.

ALIMONY IN ANNULMENT AcTIoNs.-Although the legislature
has-recently changed the statutory rules which provide some of the'
legal remedies for discontented spouses, few students of the law of
Domestic Relations would venture to predict that these changes will
be received by the public with great acclamation. For many years
the science and philosophy of the legal regulation and control of
marriage has presented to the legislature some of its most perplexing
problems. Many of those who believe that the families are the fundamental groups upon which our society is based and the primary units
of our economic system deeply lament our quite un-uniform state laws
of marriage. Different culture groups and religious organizations
have urged the legislature to adopt a great variety of drastically divergent points of view in respect to marital problems. The legislature,
consequently, has been extremely cautious, and as a result changes in
the law have been made only after extensive hesitation. Many persons believe, therefore, that the rules of this particular category of our
law have become somewhat antiquated. Hence, a change of these
rules is often regarded as a dilatory enactment which should have been
made years ago.
Recently the Civil Practice Act has been changed by adding a
new section numbered 1140-a I and by amending Section 1169.2 These
amendments set forth the first statutory authorization for the allowance of alimony in annulment actions in New York. Previously
alimony in these cases had been awarded as an impliedly necessary
exercise of the statutory power to entertain annulment actions.3 The
interpretation to be given to these statutes may be inferred in part,

'N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1140-a as added by N. Y. Laws 1940, c. 226, § 2.
"When an action is brought to annul a marriage or to declare the nullity of a
void marriage, the court may give such direction for support of the wife by the
husband as justice requires ....
This section shall apply to any action brought
by either the husband or the wife or by any other person in the lifetime of both
parties to the marriage."
2 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT § 1169 (this section governing alimony and expenses in actions for divorce and separation now includes actions to annul a
marriage and actions to declare the nullity of a void marriage).
3 Higgins v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, 8, 58 N. E. 9, 10, aff'd, 51 App. Div. 631,
64 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (2d Dept. 1900) ("The power to allow alimony and counsel
fee to the wife in order to enable her to live pending the action, and to present
her defense, if she has one, must' be regarded as incidental and necessary in all
matrimonial actions. Without such power the rights of the woman, in many
cases, could not be adequately Vrotected"). See North v. North, 1 Barb. Ch.
241 (N. Y. 1845) ; Griffin v. Griffin, 47 N. Y. 134 (1872) ; Brinkley v. Brinkley,
50 N. Y. 184 (1872).
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therefore, from the trend in New York as indicated by decisions prior
to these enactments.
Alimony is defined as "the allowance made to a wife out of her
husband's estate for her support". 4 The right to alimony is dependent
on the marital status; it exists by virtue of the obligation of the husband to support his wife. It is, perhaps, essential to distinguish
between the two classes of alimony. An allowance made for the support of the wife during a matrimonial suit is temporary alimony or
alimony pendente lite; at the termination of the suit a provision for
the support of the wife is permanent alimony.5 The right to alimony
has always accrued to a wife alone. The statutes evoke no change in
this regard, for they expressly provide "for support of the wife by the
husband". Formerly in annulment actions, temporary alimony was
awarded to a wife who was without means to defend the suit.6 Where
the action was to declare the nullity of a void marriage, it appears to
have been a condition precedent to the granting of alimony that the
wife assert the validity of the marriage as a defense.7 These allowances were made, presumably, on the theory that the marriage is valid
until the courts have pronounced it invalid, and the obligation to support continues until that time. If the action was brought by the wife,
as a general rule, no temporary alimony was granted to the wife
because she was repudiating that which was the basis of her claim to
support.8 Further, if an interested third party sought an annulment,
alimony and counsel fees were not allowed.9
Heretofore, permanent alimony was never granted in an annulment action in New York. The courts felt that in the absence of
express statutory direction they did not possess the authority to grant
the same. 10 That such legislation was necessary had been contended,
for a marriage though voidable may have given rise to effects that
cannot be equitably adjusted merely by the restoration of the parties
to their former status. "Broadly speaking the same considerations
may be present in marriages terminated by annulment as through
divorce and the same rights and remedies would seem to be appli4 BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933) 92.

5 Ibid.

6 Openheimer v. Openheimer, 153 App. Div. 636, 138 N. Y. Supp. 643 (1st
Dept. 1912); Erlanger v. Erlanger, 173 App. Div. 767, 159 N. Y. Supp. 353 (2d
Dept. 1916).
7 North v. North, 1 Barb. Ch. 241 (N. Y. 1845) ; Griffin v. Grifln, 47 N. Y.
134 (1872); Wabberson v. Wabberson, 27 Misc. 125, 57 N. Y. Supp. 405
(1899); Higgins v. Sharp, 164 N. Y. 4, 58 N. E. 9, affd, 51 App. Div. 631,
64 N. Y. Supp. 1137 (2d Dept. 1900).
s Meo v. Meo, 2 N. Y. Supp. 569 (1888) ; Heron v. Heron, 28 Misc. 323,
59 N. Y. Supp. 861 (1899). Contra: Allen v. Allen, 59 How. Pr. 27 (N. Y.
1880) ; Gore v. Gore, 44 Misc. 323, 89 N. Y. Supp. 902 (1905), aff'd, 103 App.
Div. 74, 92 N. Y. Supp. 634 (3d Dept. 1905).
9 Farnham v. Farnham, 227 N. Y. 155, 124 N. E. 894 (1919).
10 Park v. Park, 24 Misc. 372, 373, 53 N. Y. Supp. 677 (1898) ("Upon
principle there can be no provision for alimony in decree of nullity, and the
Code does not authorize it").
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cable." 11 If one reads the present statutes literally, it appears that a
substantial change has been effectuated. They provide that alimony
may be granted to a wife whether she is the plaintiff ' 2 or the defendant in the annulment action. This provision is also extended in
order to include within its purview actions brought by a third party
during the lifetime of both parties to the marriage. Consequently,
guilt or innocence is not a material factor. It is to be noted that the
enactments in question are more liberal than those granting relief in.
divorce and separation actions. In the latter cases, permanent alimony is awarded in actions brought by the wife.' 3 The present statute contains no such limitation.
Whether future analysis will deem these provisions mandatory or
merely advisory presents a difficulty. The legislature has provided
what may be a modifying clause by inserting the phrase "as justice
requires". If this clause is used as a basis for granting or denying
relief, it may be contended that there will be little or no change in the
trend as it existed prior to the enactment of the statutory change.
However, if this "loophole" phrase is not construed as a discretionary
guide for ascertaining in what instances alimony should be granted,
but instead it is held to apply only to the amount to be given, 14 then
the statute indeed works a substantial change.
MARY E. BROPHY.

NEW YORK CIVIL PRACTICE ACT § 347-TESTIMONY IN ACTION
BASED ON ACCIDENT INVOLVING NEGLIGENCE OR CONTRIBUTORY
NEGLIGENCE.-At early common law persons having no religious

belief, insane persons, those convicted of crimes, deaf and dumb persons and parties to- the action or interested in its outcome were disqualified as witnesses.' Today by various enabling statutes and decisions the tendency is to rest in the triers of the facts the ultimate value
to be given to testimony, the source being a fact to be weighed in such
determination. Thus 'a person is not rendered incompetent because
of his religious belief or disbelief.2 Persons are not excluded merely
11 1 VERNIER, AMERICAN FAMILY

(1931) 266.

12Anonymous v. Anonymous, 174 Misc. 496, 21 N. Y. S. (2d) 71 (1940)

(where plaintiff had married a man who had another wife living. Plaintiff
brought an action for support. The court held that she could institute an action
for annulment and get a direction for support under Section 1140-a of the Civil
Practice Act).
13 N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1155, 1164, 1170.
14 LAw REVISION COMMISSIoN, LEGIS. Doc. (1940)

No. 65 (H)

59.

I RICHARDSON, EVIDENCE (5th ed. 1936) § 454.
2 N. Y. CONST. Art. I, § 3 ("no person shall be rendered incompetent to

be a witness on account of his opinions on matters of religious belief").

